The Middle Kingdom Syndrome
The Strategic Rivalry Between China and India
1. Covert rivalry behind the G20 Summit
The 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit ended with bitter divisions. Some speculated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s snub to the Summit signaled Beijing’s growing disinterest in the forum in that it no longer serves China’s interests.1 The Sino-Indian rivalry is more likely the root cause of Xi Jinping’s absence. This is predictable to Beijing: should Xi Jinping attend the Summit, it would be so humiliating for him to find himself in an awkward situation where China is patently marginalized this year.
China has been seeking an alternative world order for years, yet there is so far hardly a bloc backing it up as the one that was led by the Soviet Union. Not only is the “Axis of Authoritarians” between China and Russia a fragile “axis of convenience” driven by common interests rather than shared values, but the Global South is also devoid of a common ideology and rife with discord and divergence.2
To peddle its vision of an alternative world order, China has pinned high hopes on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nevertheless, as a major member of the SCO and the BRICS, India is rather recalcitrant and has been making attempts to stymie the BRI and other Chinese initiatives.
Xi Jinping’s dismissiveness, if any, of the Summit has given India an opportunity to have a crack at elbowing China aside. This is indeed what India has achieved through the Summit. As observers noted, to gear itself up for the 2023 Summit, New Delhi not only “scheduled calls with their counterparts across the Global South, soliciting their views on what the G20 might do for their countries, and convening a Voice of Global South virtual meeting,” but also “tabled a proposal to add the African Union to the forum, which was endorsed at the summit.” More significantly, India struck a deal to launch two ambitious initiatives, namely the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Global Biofuel Alliance (GBA), and signed an agreement with the IBSA nations—India, Brazil, and South Africa, three major members of the BRICS—to collaborate with the United States on the reform of multilateral development banks. China is apparently left out of these initiatives and agreements.3 In addition to these, the G20 New Delhi Leaders Declaration on developing a G20 Framework for systems of digital public infrastructure (DPI) and India’s proposal of the One Future Alliance (OFA) to fund the DPI are likewise in India’s favor, given that the DPI is considered a potential low-cost, software equivalent to China’s BRI initiative which India rejected outright.4
The outcomes of the Summit show that India has notably elevated its international influence over both the Global South and the Global North, whereas Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Xi Jinping’s representative, went back empty-handed.
The Sino-Indian rivalry, way more complex than their border disputes, is never in any sense insignificant as it has created a third variable to the US-China relations. To gain insights into the essence and genesis of this rivalry, we shall revisit the intricacies of the geopolitical dynamics between the two neighbors.
2. The Middle Kingdom Syndrome
There are quite a few interpretations of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Susan Shirk famously claimed that it is a “one-sided rivalry” since China “does not regard India as a serious rival,” even though India has fully appreciated this rivalry with gravity.5 John Garver admits their deeply rooted rivalry and would rather view it as “asymmetric” than “one-sided,” owing to 1) the mobilization function of the Chinese media downplaying Indian threats and to 2) China’s more successful moves to counter India over the last decades than India to China.6 Odd Arne Westad argued that India would inevitably become the biggest challenge to China’s foreign policy,7 and recent research has shown that China has begun to take the Indian threats more seriously.8
Cognizant of the lack of mutual economic interdependence and the absence of mutual accommodation of each other’s interests and core security concerns,9 both of which might have contributed to the Sino-Indian rivalry, Mohan Malik proposed a hypothesis of Middle Kingdom Syndrome, largely forgotten nowadays.
The hypothesis assumes that historically and civilizationally, while China was or still identifies itself as the “Middle Kingdom”—which the Chinese word for “China” (zhōng guó) literally means—or the central power of East Asia, India sees itself as the “Middle Kingdom” of South Asia.10 “When Chinese and Indian elites speak of restoring their country’s rightful place in the world, they give expression to a concept of ‘centrality’ in Asia and the wider world,” writes Malik.11
However, it should be noted that there was not any sense of Asia throughout the respective dynasties in their own history. The sense of “centrality” stems from the supremacy both China and India once enjoyed within their own sphere of influence throughout their own histories. Such a sense of “centrality” served actually as the world outlook of their respective dynasties. The world outlook of Chinese dynasties in history was primarily shaped by their Sino-centric tributary system, which largely included East and Southeast Asia. These Chinese dynasties viewed themselves as the center of the world, in spite of the fact that they knew the existence of India after the introduction of Buddhism, and that many of them were constantly harried by nomadic tribes from Mongolia to Central Asia, who utterly rejected either the Sinicization, the supremacy or centrality of these Chinese dynasties, or all of the above.12
The Indian sense of centrality, in Austin Coates’s view, is derived from the religious philosophy of Hinduism, an all-embracing system where everything to do with human thought and activity has a place, and which alone gives it its sanction. As Hindu and Buddhist traditions spread to and influenced South and Southeast Asian peoples and states, an indelible imprint was left to their indigenous political and religious cultures. In Southeast Asian medieval empires and kingdoms, the king “became the incarnation of the tutelary god, whether Vishnu, Siva, or Buddha Avalokitesvara, the embodiment of supreme and universal power, emanating from heaven through his ancestors, and extending far beyond the furthest terrestrial boundaries.”13 The Hindu thought carried by Buddhism reached also East Asia and influenced China itself.
When Coates asserted that while the Indian centrality is of the mind, its Chinese equivalent is material and terrestrial, personified in the Chinese race, and supremely embodied in kings and emperors,14 the idea of the Indian centrality is more a cultural-historical mindset than a geopolitical one, which is contrary to the Chinese centrality.
“Since there was not much interaction between the two Asian centers of civilizations and power despite their proximity, each had developed, by and large, in its own isolation, with its own sphere of influence and worldview regarding its place in the wider world,” adds Malik.15 The sense of centrality actually “brings with it a certain sense of superiority,” as Coates put it.16
Based on their own sense of superiority, Indian elites not only view (international) society as a hierarchical one according to wealth and power, but also believe that “India should be in the top ranks of the world hierarchy—a Brahmin idea of the world.” Indian leaders entertain an analogous idea when they are seeking to establish their country as a preeminent power in the South Asian or Indian Ocean region.17
The Chinese sense of centrality with an important bearing on Chinese strategic design perceives or is endeavoring to facilitate a multipolar world order similar to China’s Warring States era (475-221 BC), and such an outlook, according to Malik, “necessitates distrust of strong, powerful neighbors (e.g., India) and preference for small, weak, and subordinate or client states.”18
Although Malik never meant to confine the Middle Kingdom Syndrome to the Sino-Indian rivalry, its narrow sense has perfectly revealed the security dilemma between China and India. As Malik has pointed out, “Both China and India have sought to establish a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their regions with mixed degrees of success. Both claim that their attitude toward their neighbors is essentially benevolent while making it clear that they must not make policies or take actions, or allow other nations to take measures in their countries that would impinge on, respectively, Chinese or Indian interests and security.”19 Thus, the Sino-Indian relations are bogged down in the prisoner’s dilemma.
3. Strategic rivalry
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has long been obsessed with “catching up with the West” or “leapfrogging” to achieve the so-called national rejuvenation.20 Already as the second largest economy, China still has a mania for “overtaking (the US) on the curve” (in Chinese, wan dao chao che, 彎道超車)21 and for an advantage “miles ahead of the competition (with the West)” (in Chinese, yao yao ling xian, 遙遙領先).22 Malik contended that this should be attributed to the fact that, as Martin Jacques noted over a decade ago, “China lives in and with its past to such an extent that it is tormented by its failure during the late twentieth century to stay at the top of the international system.”23
The excessive obsession with (a revisionist view of) history and the past is found not only in Chinese diplomacy which often plays “the history card,” but also in Chinese nationalism. To quote Jacques, “Imperial Sinocentrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism.”24 From this point of view, the Chinese national rejuvenation is only to be secured at the price of other powers being edged out of its way.
Even though India is not standing in the way of China’s “catch-up-and-outstrip” ambitions, China has never abjured its attempts to subdue India. To hold India in check, China developed a strategy called “supporting and uniting with the small states (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) to fight the big one (India)” (in Chinese, he xiao gong da, 合小攻大).25 As a result of this policy, China successfully aligned itself with Pakistan and built closer ties with Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh, which also played “the China card” in their relations with India throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This was the reason why India sought to forge closer relations with the Soviet Union and Vietnam during this period when they were China’s rivals.26 Beijing was only willing to improve its relations with India in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 when China was isolated and vulnerable owing to international sanctions. That being said, the cooperation with India was only restricted to specific issues such as human rights, environment and the US hegemony, and China continued to sell weapons to all of India’s neighbors which happened to be China’s top five arms buyers.27
China’s involvement in the civil wars and the post-war politics of Sri Lanka and Nepal was of malicious intent from India’s perspective. China’s investment in the port construction in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port in Cambodia, the Kyaukphyu port in Burma, the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, the Gwadar port in Pakistan, the PLA military base in Djibouti, mostly along or near the coast of the Indian Ocean, made India hyper-vigilant of China’s strategic purposes. While such ports are used to safeguard China’s economic lifelines, they could also pose a major threat to India’s safety.
The economic asymmetry was also exploited to restrain India. While China saw India as a large market for dumping Chinese products, as perceived by India it became a predator in trade: it not only limited market access to Indian goods and services, but also imposed non-trade barriers in the area of IT, pharmaceuticals, energy, Bollywood movies, and agricultural produce.28
A resounding success of East Asian economies did little to improve the underdevelopment of South Asian countries. Conversely, India as South Asia’s largest economy felt increasingly alienated by the geoeconomically inclined East Asian regionalism. Excluded from “Asia-Pacific” institutions like APEC, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 which are in charge of promoting regional cooperation and integration, India found that it could not benefit from the booming markets where China’s geopolitical clout and economic prowess are of a dominating presence. Worse, the continuously widening trade deficits from East Asian economies are placing India at the losing end. India’s open-arm embrace of the “Indo-Pacific” vision is in a large degree attributed to such an imbalance of regional economic development, which is palpably unfair to India.29
On top of economic repression such as those, China leaves no stone unturned to pit itself against India, either by thwarting India’s entry into regional and international organizations, or by marginalizing India within them. China vetoed India’s candidacy for the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and was ranged against India at the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).30
Recent research indicates the positional contest between China and India has become more central to the rivalry overall. To be specific, China and India have been thrown into a duel jostling for the leadership not only in South Asia but in the larger Asian region, despite the widening asymmetry in their material capabilities.31 Recent researchers identified contrasting perceptions of India’s position within the regional hierarchies between the two rivals.32 Yet a few years ago, Malik has already perceived the disparate demands between the two neighbors: “Whereas India is non-status-quoist in terms of status, power and influence, China remains non-status-quoist in terms of territory, power and influence.”33 India’s discontent over its status within the regional hierarchies will not keep it away from the battlefield. New Delhi fully embracing the Indo-Pacific order to counter China has demonstrated a clear-cut strategic shift from “strategic autonomy” towards “strategic co-ordination” with like-minded countries like the US, Japan, and Australia.34 Yet just a decade ago India was still bedeviled by “a fractious polity and the lack of strategic thinking.”35
Indeed, the territorial disputes between the two neighbors result from the retreat of British colonialism. Yet regardless of border skirmishes, India and China will still vie with one another in the Asia-Pacific region, as Malik stated.36 To some extent, the territorial disputes between the two neighbors have clearly deviated from the original concerns. M. Taylor Fravel actually repudiated China’s sham concerns over territorial issues as he found substantial records of China deliberately renouncing territories for various purposes.37 India’s “Tibet card”—just like China’s “Pakistan card”—is played as a result of deeper conflicts, not the other way around.
Michael Schuman. September 9, 2023. “Xi Jinping Is Done With the Established World Order.” The Atlantic. Accessed on September 12, 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/09/g20-summit-china-xi-absence/675267/
Aaron L. Friedberg. April 6, 2023. “A World of Blocs.” CSIS. Accessed on September 12, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/world-blocs
Ian Hall. September 11, 2023. “India pushes China to the margins of the G20.” The Intepreter. Accessed on September 12, 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-pushes-china-margins-g20
Chietigj Bajpaee. September 7, 2023. “The G20 showcases India’s growing power. It could also expose the limits of its foreign policy.” Chatham House. Accessed on September 12, 2023. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/g20-showcases-indias-growing-power-it-could-also-expose-limits-its-foreign-policy. Also cf. Anupam Manur. September 11, 2023. “G20 Summit: India takes its Digital Public Infrastructure success to the world.” Money Control. Accessed on September 12, 2023. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/g20-summit-india-takes-its-digital-public-infrastructure-success-to-the-world-11346651.html
Susan Shirk. 2004. “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and Policies toward India.” In Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding eds. The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. New York: Columbia University Press, p75–p100.
John Garver. 2002. “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese threat perceptions.” Journal of Strategic Studies 25(4): p109-p134. Also cf. Šumit Ganguly, Manjeet S. Pardesi, and William R. Thompson. 2023. The Sino-Indian Rivalry: Implications for Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Odd Arne Westad. 2012. Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750. New York: Basic Books.
Manjeet S. Pardesi. 2019. “The Initiation of the Sino-Indian rivalry.” Asian Security 15(3): p253, p275.
Mohan Malik. 2011. China and India: Great Power Rivals. Boulder and London: First Forum Press, p3, p44-p46.
ibid., p28.
ibid., p21.
Cf. Hendrik Spruyt. 2020. The World Imagined Collective Beliefs and Political Order in the Sinocentric, Islamic and Southeast Asian International Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Austin Coates. 1972. China, India and the Ruins of Washington. New York: The John Day Company, p59, p31.
ibid., p51.
Mohan Malik, 2011, p21.
Austin Coates, 1972, p50.
Mohan Malik, 2011, p28.
ibid., p25.
ibid., p28.
ibid., p22.
Yōichi Funabashi. January 9, 2019. “Will China overtake the U.S. on the curve?” The Japan Times. Accessed on September 13, 2023. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/01/09/commentary/world-commentary/will-china-overtake-u-s-curve/
李娜 (Li Na). September 12, 2023. “刚刚! 余承东现身华为发布会, 说了五次‘遥遥领先’ (Breaking News! Yu Chengdong Appears at Huawei Press Conference, Reiterating ‘Miles Ahead of the Competition’ Five Times).” YiCai. Accessed on September 13, 2023. https://www.yicai.com/news/101856758.html
Martin Jacques. 2009. When China Rules the World. New York: The Penguin Press, p418.
ibid.. p244. See also: Mohan Malik, 2011, p23.
Mohan Malik, 2011, p29-p30.
ibid., p38-p39.
ibid., p41-p42.
ibid., p45-p46.
Jitendra Uttam. 2023. “India’s tryst with the Indo-Pacific.” In Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies, Barbara Kratiuk, Jeroen J. J. Van den Bosch, Aleksandra Jaskólska and Yoichiro Sato eds. p366-p389. New York and London: Routledge, p374.
Mohan Malik, 2011, p46.
Šumit Ganguly, Manjeet S. Pardesi, and William R. Thompson, 2023, p10, p14, p26-p29.
ibid., p28.
Mohan Malik, 2011, p24.
Jitendra Uttam, 2023, p375.
Mohan Malik, 2011, p31.
ibid., p45.
M. Taylor Fravel. 2009. Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.